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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[83 C.Jd 8; ~ Cal.Rptr. 17. 403 P.2d 1451 
[L. A. No. 2761S. In Bank. June 23, 1965.] 
DANIEL J. SEELY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WHITE 
MOTOR COMP A~~, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Automobiles-Sales-Warranties.-An award of damages in a 
breach of warranty action for lost profits and for money paid 
on the purchase price of a truck sold under an express war-
ranty that it was free from defects in material and workman-
ship under normal use and service was proper where the 
natural tendency of the warranty was to induce buyers to rely 
on it and plaintiff did so rely, where the truck bounced vio-
lently in use, and where reliance on the warranty and the 
warranty itself were manifested by defendant manufacturer's 
continued efforts to have the truck repaired, and by defend-
ant's acceptance of the responsibility to correct the bouncing. 
(S] Sales-Warranties-Express Warranty.-The statute defining 
an express warranty (Civ. Code, § 1732; Com. Code, §§ 2313, 
2314) requires only that plaintiff rely on the warranty; it 
does not additionally require that plaintiff be aware that the 
warranty was made by the manufacturer, instead of the dealer, 
to reach the one who in fact made it. 
(3] ld.-Buyer's Remedies-Action for Breach of Warranty.-A 
warrantor who repeatedly fails to correct a defect as promised 
is liable for breach of that promise as a breach of warranty. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Automobiles, § 435. 
Kelt. Dig. References: [1, 4, 7, 12-15, 20] Automobiles, § 49; [2] 
Sales, §ll6; [3] Sales, §2S3; [5] Sales, §373; [6] Automobiles, 
149; Sales, § 255; [S] Appeal and Error, § 196(5); [9, 21, 22] 
Products Liability; [10, 17, IS) Products Liability; Sales, § 110; 
[11, 19J Sales, § 110; [16J Products Liability; Sales, § 283. 
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[4] Automobiles-Sales-Warranties.-Where therc was an ex-
press manufacturer's warranty to plaintiff in the purchase 
order for a truck sold him by a dealer, no privity of contract 
was required in a suit against the manufacturer for breach 
of warranty. 
[5J Sales - Damages - Breach of Warranty - Loss of Profits.-
Damages awarded for the loss directly and naturally resulting 
in the ordinary course of events from a breach of warranty 
(Civ. Code, § 1789, subd. 6; Com. Code, § 2714) can properly 
include lost profits, as well as the amount paid on thc purchase 
price. 
[6] Automobiles-Sales-Warranties: Sales-Buyer's Remedies-
Election of Remedies.-In an action against a truck manu-
facturer for consequential damages arising out of a breach of 
an express warranty, and not against the immediate seIler for 
rescission of the contract of sale, the sales act does not compel 
an election of remedies. (cf. Com. Code, § 2608, Comment 1.) 
[7] Id.-Sales-Warranties.-In a breach of warranty action 
against a truck manufacturer, it could not be said that the 
trial court, in estimating that 60 per cent of the lost gross 
earnings of plaintiff was lost profits, failed to take rental 
value of the truck into account when evaluating the estimates 
of profit percentages ranging from 25 to 77 per cent. 
[8] Appeal-Reserving Questions-Findings.-One failing to re-
quest a finding on a particular issue cannot complain on appeal 
that a specific finding was not made. (Code Civ. Proc., § 634.) 
[9] Products Liability-Purpose of Doctrine.-The history of the 
doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was de-
signed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales 
act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern 
the distinct problem of physical injuries. 
[10] Id.-Suitability of Warranty Theory: Sales-Warranties.-
Thc unsuitability of the warranty theory to the field of lia-
bility for personal injuries caused by a defective manufactured 
product does not mean that the warranty theory has no func-
tion at all; the law of warranty grew as a branch of the law 
of commercial transactions and was primarly aimed at con-
trolling the commercial aspects of these transactions. 
[11] Sales-Warranties.-The rules of warranty determine the 
quality of the product the manufacturer promises and thereby 
determine the quality he must deliver. 
[12] Automobiles - Sales - Warranties.-A truck manufacturer 
was liable for a retail buyer's loss of profits and for refund of 
money paid on a truck, where it warranted the truck to be 
"free from defects in material and workmanship under normal 
use and service." 
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Sales, § 93; Am.Jur., Sales (1st ed § 299). 
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[13] Id.-Sales-Warranties.-The parties' practical construction 
of the seller's warranty that a truck was free from defects in 
material and workmanship under normal use and service dur-
ing the 11 months that repairs on the truck were attempted, 
established that the buyer's use of the truck was a normal use 
within the meaning of the warranty. 
[14] Id.-Sales--Warranties.-A truck manufacturer's failure to 
comply with its obligation to make good at its factory any 
defective part of the truck, after ample opportunity to do so, 
entitled th~ purchaser from a dealer to recover damages re-
sulting from such breach against the manufacturer. 
[15] Id.-Sales--Warranties.-A truck manufacturer was liable 
for damages sustained by a truck buyer due to the defective 
condition of the truck only because of its agreemcnt to replnce 
defective parts, as defined by its continuing practice over 11 
months; without an agreement defined by practice 01' other-
wise, the manufacturer would not have been liable for com-
mercial losses resulting from the inability to use the truck for 
normal purposes. 
(16] Products Liability-Distinctions: Sales-Buyer's Remedies-
Action for Breach of Warranty.-The distinction that the law 
draws between tort recovery for physical injuries and war-
ranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does .not 
rest on one plaintiff's having an accident causing physical 
injury, but rather on an understanding of the nature of the 
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake ill distributing 
his products. 
[17] Id.-Distinctions: Sales-Warranties.-A manufacturer can 
appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by 
defects in manufactured products by requiring his goods to 
match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that 
create unreasonable risks of harm, but cannot be held for the 
level of performance of his products in the consumer's busi-
ness, unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet 
the consumer's demands. 
(18] Id.-Distinctions: Sales--Warranties.-A consumer should 
not be charged, at the will of the manufacturer, with bearing 
the risk of' physical injury when he buys a product on the 
market; but he can be fairly charged with the risk that the 
product will not match his economic expectations, unless the 
manufacturer agrees that it will. 
[19] Sales--Warranties.-The law of warranty is not limited to 
parties in a somewhat equal bargaining position. 
[20] Automobiles--Sales-Warranties.-There was no inequality 
in the bargaining position of the manufacturer and buyer of a 
truck, insofar as the damages recovered by the buyer for his 
purchase price and loss of profits arc concerned; the buyer, 
whose business was trucking, could have shopped around until 
) 
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he found a truck fulfilling his business needs and could be 
fairly charged with the risk that the product would not match 
his economic expectations, unless the manufacturer agreed 
that it would. 
[21] Products Liability-Physical Injury to Property.-Though 
the law of warranty governs the economic relation between a 
manufacturer and a buyer, the doctrine of strict liability in 
tort should be extended to govern physical injury to plaintiff's 
property, as well as personal injury. 
[22] Id.-Findings.-In a truck buyer's action against the truck 
manufacturer, a finding that there was no proof that the defect 
in the truck caused the physical damage to it, though am-
biguous, was sufficient, absent a request by plaintiff for a 
specific finding (Code Civ. Proc., § 634); since the testimony 
on causation was in conflict, the trial court's resolution of the 
conflict is controlling. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern 
County. William L. Bradshaw, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by retailer's customer against manufacturer for 
breach of express and implied warranties in the sale of a truck, 
for breach of contract and for property damages. Judgment 
for plaintiff affirmed. 
John M. Nairn for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Baker, Palmer & Wall and Oran W. Palmer for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In October 1959 plaintiff entered into 
a conditional sales contract with Southern Truck Sales for 
the purchase of a truck manufactured by defendant, White 
Motor Company. Plaintiff purchased the truck for use in his 
business of heavy-duty haUling. Upon taking possession of 
the truck, plaintiff found that it bounced violently, an action 
known as "galloping." For 11 months after the purchase, 
Southern, with' guidance from 'Vhite's representatives, made 
many unsuccessful attempts to correct the galloping. On 
July 22, 1960, when slowing down for a turn, plaintiff found 
that the brakes did not work. The truck overturned, and 
plaintiff, who was not personally injured, had the damage re-
paired for $5,466.09. In September 1960, after paying 
$11,659.44 of the purchase price of $22,041.76, plaintiff served 
notice that he would make no more payments. Southern 
thereafter repossessed the truck and resold it for $13,000. 
Plaintiff brought this action against Southern and White 
) 
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seeking (1) damages, related to the accident, for the repair 
of the truck, and (2) damages, unrelated to the accident, for 
the money he had paid on the purchase price and for the 
profits lost in his business because he was unable to make 
normal use of the truck. During the trial plaintiff dismissed 
the action against Southern without prejudice. The court 
found that \Vhite breached its warranty to plaintiff and en-
tered judgment for plaintiff for $20,899.84, consisting of 
$11,659.44 for payments 011 the purchase price and $9,240.40 
for lost profits. It found that plaintiff had not proved that the 
galloping caused the accident and therefore denied his claim 
for $5,466.09 for the repair of the truck. Both plaintiff and 
White appeal from the judgment. 
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in award-
ing damages for lost profits and for the money paid on the 
purchase price of the truck. We do not agree with this con-
tention. The award was proper on the basis of a breach of 
express warranty. 
Defendant included the following promise in the printed 
form of the purchase order signed by plaintiff: "The White 
Motor Company hereby warrants each new motor vehicle sold 
by it to be free from defects in material and workmanship 
under normal use and service, its obligation under the war· 
ranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or 
parts thereof. . . ." This promise meets the statutory re-
quirement for an express warranty: "Any affirmation of fact 
or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express 
warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or prom-
ise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the 
buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." (Civ. Code, 
§ 1732 j cf. Com. Code, §§ 2313, 2314.) 1 The natural tendency 
of White's promise was to induce buyers to rely on it. and 
plaintiff did so rely in purchasing the goods. The reliance 
on the warranty, and the warranty itself, are manifested by 
plaintiff's continued efforts to have the truck repaired, and 
by defendant's acceptance of the responsibility to correct the 
galloping. [2] The statute requires only that plaintiff rely 
on the warranty. It does not additionally require that he he 
aware that it was made by the manufacturer instead of the 
dealer to reach the one who in fact made it. Surely if plain-
tiff sought to have a part replaced that was covered by the 
lEfl'eetive January I, 1965, the uniform sales act (Civ. Code, §§ 1721-
1800) was revised, renumbered, and transferred to the Commercial Code. 
Citation is given to the comparable sections of both eodes. 
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warranty, 'White could not escape its obligation by showing 
that plaintiff thought the warranty White made was made by 
the dealer. 
Defendant contends that its limitation of its obligation to 
repair and replacement, and its statement that its warranty 
"is expressly in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or im-
plied," are sufficient to operate as a disclaimer of responsi-
bility in damages for breach of warranty. This contention is 
untenable. [3] 'Vhen, as here, the warrantor repeatedly 
fails to correct the defect as promised, it is liable for the 
breach of that promise as a breach of warranty. (Rose v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal.App.2d 755, 762-763 [28 Cal. 
Rptr. 185, 99 A.L.R.2d 1411] ; Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301, 
308 [310 P .2d 923].) [4] Since there was an express war-
ranty to plaintiff in the purchase order, no privity of contract 
was required. (See Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Ca1.2d 
682, 696 [268 P.2d 1041].) Plaintiff also gave reasonable 
notice of the defect. (Civ. Code, § 1769; cf. Com. Code, 
§ 2607.) 
[5] The damages awarded by the trial court, "the loss 
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of 
events from the breach of warranty" (Civ. Code, § 1789, subd. 
6; cf. Com. Code, § 2714), can properly include lost profits 
(Grupe v. Glick, 26 Ca1.2d 680, 692 [160 P.2d 832]; Mack v. 
Hugh W. Comstock Associates, Inc., 225 Cal.App.2d 583, 587 
[37 Cal.Rptr. 466]) as well as the amount paid on the pur-
chase price. Defendant contends that plaintiff must elect 
between these remedies, relying on an analogy to the sales act 
requirement of election between rescission and damages. (Civ. 
Code, § 1789.) [6] Since this action, however, is against the 
manufacturer for consequential damages and not against the 
immediate seller for rescission of the contract of sale, the 
sales act does not compel an election of remedies. The often 
critic'zed rule of election of remedies (see, e.g., Ezer, The 
Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California 
Law of Sales 1V arran ties, 8 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 281, 330), has not 
bren adopted by the Commercial Code (Com. Code, § 2608, 
comment 1), and should not be extended to apply here. 
[7] Defendant also contends that the damages awarded are 
excessive'since the rental value of the truck was not offset 
against plaintiff's claim for lost profits. Plaintiff replies that, 
in estimating that 60 per cent of the lost gross earnings was 
lost profits, the trial court deducted a reasonable rental value 
for the truck. We cannot say that the trial court failed to 
take rental value into account when it evaluated the estimates 
• • "411( 
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of profit percentage that ranged from 25 per cent to 77 per 
cent. [8] Since defendant failed to request a finding on the 
issue of an appropriate rental value, it cannot complain that 
a specific finding was not made. { Code Civ. Proc., § 634.) 
It is contended that the foregoing legislative scheme of re-
covery has been superseded by the doctrine of strict liability 
in tort set forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 
59 Ca1.2d 57, 63 [27 Cul.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897], and Van-
dermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Ca1.2d 256, 261 [37 Cal.Rptr. 
896, 391 P.2d 168]. 'We cannot agree with this contention. 
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the 
economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods. 
[9] The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indi-
cates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty 
provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code 
but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries. 
An important early step in the development of the law of 
products liability was the recognition of a manufacturer's 
liability in negligence to an ultimate consumer without privity 
of contract. (Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N.Y. 
382, 389 [111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F 696].) About the 
same time, the courts began to hold manufacturers liable with-
out negligence for personal injuries. Over a score of theories . 
were developed to support liability (see Gillam, Products Lia-
bility in a Nutshell, 37 Ore.L.Rev. 119,153-155), and the one 
that was generally accepted was borrowed from the law of 
sales warranty. (See Prosser, The Assa1£lt Upon the Citadel, 
69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1126.) "Only by some violent pounding 
and twisting," however, could the warranty doctrine be made 
to serve this purpose. (Patterson, The Apportionment of Busi-
ness Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 Colum.L.Rev. 335, 358; 
see also Prosser, supra, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1124-1134.) Final 
recognition that "The remedies of injured consumers ought 
not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of 
sales" (Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323; Greenman 
v. Yu,",a Power Products, Inc., 59 Ca1.2d 57, 64 [27 Cal.Rptr. 
697, 377 P.2d 897]) caused this court to abandon the fiction 
of warranty in favor of strict liability in tort. (Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, at p. 63; Vandermark v. 
Ford Motor Co., 61 Ca1.2d 256, 261 [37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 
P.2d 168].) 
[10] The fact that the warranty theory was not suited to 
the field of liability for personal injuries. however, does not 
mean that it has no function at all. In Gt'unman we recog-
,) 
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nized only that •• rules defining and governing warranties that 
were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions 
cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's 
liability to those injured by its defective products unless those 
rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is im-
posed." (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 
Ca1.2d 57, 63.) Although the rules governing warranties com-
plicated resolution of the problems of personal injuries, there 
is no reason to conclude that they do not meet the "needs of 
commercial transactions." The law of warranty • C grew as a 
branch of the law of commercial transactions and was pri-
marily aimed at controlling the commercial aspects of these 
transactions." (See James, Products LiabiUty, 34 Tax.L.Rev. 
192; Llewellyn, On Warronty of Quality, and Society, 36 
Colum.L.Rev. 699, 37 Colum.L.Rev. 341.) 
Although the rules of warranty frustrate rational compen-
sation for physical injury, they function well in a commercial 
setting. (See Com. Code, § 2719; Prosser, supra, 69 Yale L.J. 
1099, 1130, 1133.) [11] These rules determine the quality 
of the product the manufacturer promises and thereby deter-
mine the quality he must deliver. In this case, the truck 
plaintiff purchased did not function properly in his business. 
Plaintiff therefore seeks to recover his commercial losses: lost 
profits and the refund of the money he paid on the truck. 
[12] White is responsible for these losses only because it 
warranted the truck to be C C free from defects in material and 
workmanship under normal use and service. " [13] The prac-
tical construction of this language by both parties during the 
11 months that repairs were attempted establishes that plain-
tiff's use of the truck was a normal use within the meaning 
of the warranty. (See Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Ca1.2d 95, 
108 [173 P.2d 17].) [14] White's failure to comply with its 
obligation to make "good at its factory any part or parts" 
of the truck after ample opportunity was given it to do so, 
entitles plaintiff to recover damages resulting from such 
breach. Had defendant not warranted the truck, but sold it 
cc as is," it should not be liable for the failure of the truck to 
serve plaintiff's 'business needs. 
Under the doctrine of strict liability in tort, however, the 
manufacturer would be liable even though it did not agree 
that the truck would perform as plaintiff wished or expected 
it to do. In this case, after plaintiff returned the truck, South-
ern resold it to Mr. Jack Barefield, an experienced trucker. 
Mr. Barefield used the truck cc to pull a 40-foot band" over 
state highways. After driving the truck 82,000 miles, he 
~, 
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testified that he had no unusual difficulty with it. Southern 
replaced two tires, added a new fifth wheel, and made minor 
alterations to the truck before reselling it to Mr. Barefield, 80 
that it is possible that it found a cure for the galloping. 
Southern, however, replaced the tires five times, adjusted the 
fifth wheel, and made many other changes on the truck dur-
ing the 11 months plaintiff drove it.2 Thus, it is more likely 
that the truck functioned normally when put to use in Mr. 
Barefield's business because his use made demands upon it 
different from those made by plaintiff's use. If under these 
circumstances defendant is strictly liable in tort for the com-
mercial loss suffered by plaintiff, then it would be liable for 
business losses of other truckers caused by the failure of its 
trucks to meet the specific needs of their businesses, even 
though those needs were communicated only to the dealer. 
Moreover, this liability could not be disclaimed, for one pur-
pose of strict liability in tort is to prevent a manufacturer 
from defining the scope of his responsibilty for harm caused by 
his products. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 
Cal.2d 57, 63 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897].) The manu-
facturer would be liable for damages of unknown and unlim-
ited scope. Application of the rules of warranty prevents this 
result. {15] Defendant is liable only because of its agree-
ment as defined by its continuing practice . over 11 months. 
Without an agreement, defined by practice or otherwise, de-
fendant should not be liable for these commercial losses. 
In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 {207 
A.2d 305], the plaintiff purchased from a retailer carpeting 
that soon began to develop unusual lines. The court held the 
manufacturer liable for the difference between the price paid 
for the carpet and its actual market value on the basis of 
strict liability in tort. We are of the opinion, however, that 
it was inappropriate to impose liability on that basis in the 
Santor case, for it would result in imposing liability without 
regard to what representations of quality the manufacturer 
made. It was only because the defendant in tl1at case marketed 
the rug as Grade :#1 that the court was justified in holding 
• 
2The following changes were made on the truck: five sets of front 
springs; five drive line changes; alteration of back springs; replacement 
of front shock absorbers; fish plating of frame; replacement of clutch 
brake; replacement of two clutch release bearings; replacement of pilot 
bearing; replacement of two auxiliary transmissions; reinstallation of 
neW' front bearings; front end aligned six times; entire tru<,k and trailer 
a1imed twice; welded cross member; new cross member installed; re-
placed tires five times; moved fifth wheel hll<'k and forth. 
) 
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that the rug was defective. Had the manufacturer not 80 
described the rug, but sold it "as is," or sold it disclaiming 
any guarantee of quality, there would have been no basis for 
recovery in that case. Only if someone had been injured be-
cause the rug was unsafe for use would there have been any 
basis for imposing strict liability in tort. 
[16] The distinction that the law has drawn hetween tort 
recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for 
economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" 
of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. 
The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the 
nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake 
in distributing his products. [17] He can appropriately be 
held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by re-
quiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in 
terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. 
He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products 
in the consumer's business unless be agrees that the product 
was designed to meet the consumer's demands. [18] A con-
sumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer 
with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a pro-
duct on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with 
the risk that the product will not match his economic expecta-
tions unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in 
actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to 
damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for 
economic loss alone. (Wyatt v. Oadillac Motor Oar Division, 
145 Cal.App.2d 423, 426 [302 P.2d 665], disapproved on other 
grounds in Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Ca1.2d 21, 31 [27 Cal.Rptr. 
689, 377 P.2d 889] ; Trans World Airlines v. Ourtiss-Wright 
Oorp., 1 Misc.2d 477 [148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290].) The Restate-
ment of Torts similarly limits strict liability to physical harm 
to person or property. (Rest. 2d Torts (Tent. Draft No. 
10), § 402 A.) 
[19] The law of warranty is not limited to parties in a 
somewhat equal bargaining position. Such a limitation is not 
supported by the language and history of the sales act and 
is unworkable. Moreover, it finds no support in Greenman. 
The rationale of that case does not rest on the analysis of 
the financial strength or bargaining power of the parties to 
the particular action. It rests, rather, on the proposition that 
"The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may 
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and 
a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the 
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of 
~. 1 ---.. - f 
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doing business. " (Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 CaL 
2d 453, 462 [150 P.2d 436] [concurring opinion].) That 
rationale in no way justifies requiring the consuming public 
to pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can 
insure against the possibility that some of his products will 
not meet the business needs of some of his customers. 
[20] Finally, there was no inequality in bargaining position 
insofar' as the damages plaintiff recovered in this case are 
concerned. Unlike the defendant in Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 [161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 11, 
f White is not seeking to enforce an industry-wide disclaimer of 
liability for personal injuries. Here, plaintiff, whose business 
is trucking, could have shopped around until he found the 
truck that would fulfill his business needs. He could be 
fairly charged with the risk that the product would not match 
his economic expectations, unless the manufacturer agreed 
that it would. Indeed, the Uniform Commercial Code ex-
pressly recognizes this distinction by providing that limita-
tion of damages is prima facie unconscionable in personal in-
jury eases, but not in cases of commercial loss. (Com. Code, 
§ 2719.) 
. [21] Plaintiff contends that, even though the law of war-
ranty governs the economic relations between the parties, the . 
doctrine of strict liability in tort should be extended to 
govern physical injury to plaintiff's property, as well as 
personal injury. We agree with this contention. Physical 
injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is 
. no reason to distinguish them. (See Prosser, supra, 69 Yale 
L.J. 1099, 1143; Rest. 2d Torts (Tent. Draft No. 10), § 402 A; 
cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Ca1.2d 57, 62 
[27 CaI.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897].) [22] In this case, how-
ever, the trial court found that there was no proof that the 
defect caused the physical damage to the truck. The finding 
of no. causation, although ambiguous, was sufficient absent 
a request by plaintiff for a specific finding. (See Code Civ. 
Proc., § 634.) Since the testimony on causation was in con-
flict, the trial court's resolution of the conflict is controlling. 
The judgment.is affirmed, each side to bear its own costs on 
these appeals. 
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Peek,; J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., 
eoncurred. 
PETERS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
affirmance of the judgment, but on grounds different from the 
i 
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majority. The majority permit recovery on the theory that 
there was a breach of an express warranty. Then the majority 
say, unnecessarily and gratuitously, that plaintiff cannot re-
cover on the theory of strict liability. Both the holding and 
the dicta are, in my opinion, incorrect.'-
There was no breach of express warranty. It is funda-
mental that no one is liable for the breach of an express war-
ranty unless the buyer relies upon that warranty (former 
Civ. Code, § 1732) or unless the warranty constitutes "part 
of the basis of the bargain" (Com. Code, § 2313). Here, the 
undisputed facts show that plaintiff did not rely on White 
being responsible under the warranty, and it is clear that 
White's responsibility was not "part of the basis of the bar-
gain. " The uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that plain-
tiff had no idea that White was a party to the warranty and 
that he relied solely on Southern's responsibility.1 The ma-
jority say that the statute requires only that plaintiff rely 
on "the warranty," and not that he be aware of who made 
it. But one does not rely upon a mere scrap of paper which 
calls itself a warranty. He relies on the fact that a certain 
responsible party (which he may know as "the manufacturer" 
rather than by name) will "stand behind" the product and 
perform in accordance with the terms of the warranty. Here 
plaintiff admits that he relied on Southern's responsibility 
under the warranty, but not on White's. 
The majority, having found in favor of the plaintiff on the 
theory of an express warranty, completely decided the case. 
There was no need to discuss the strict liability doctrine. 
Everything said by the majority on that subject is obvi-
ously dicta. The problem of what damages may be recovered 
in an action based on strict liability is a most important ques-
tion of first impression in this state. It is too important to 
be decided in a mere "advisory opinion." But because' the 
majority have elected to discuss it, and have done so, I 
submit, erroneously, I cannot allow the erroneous dicta to go 
unchallengt!d. 
IPlaintiff had read a warranty,provision on a eopy of the eontraet that 
was not used. He did not read the warranty provision in the eontraet 
that was used, but assumed it was identical to the provision he had read 
(which it apparently was). He was asked at trial: 
"Q. Well, you understood from the other warranty which you read 
that the warranty that was made was made to you by the White Motor 
Company, did you nott A. No, I didn't understand that at all . 
. '. . .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. . 
"You understood from tllnt White Motor Company was the one that 
was making the warranty to you, didn't you' A. No, air." 
I 
! 
I 
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Given the rationale of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 
Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897J, it 
cannot properly be held that plaintiff may not recover the 
value of his truck and his lost profits on the basis of strict 
liability. The nature of the damage sustained by the plain-
tiff is immaterial, so long as it proximately flowed from the 
defect. What is important is not the nature of the damage 
but the relative roles played by the parties to the purchase 
contract and the nature of their transaction. 
Recently in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. (1965) 
44 N.J. 52 [207 A.2d 305), the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
held that the strict liability theory California adopted in 
Greenman applies to "economic loss" as well as to personal 
injury damages. There plaintiff bought carpeting from a local 
retailer. When the carpeting became useless because of cer-
tain defects, plaintiff sued the manufacturer. In allowing 
plaintiff to recover the difference between the price he paid 
and the actual market value of the carpeting, the court 
expressly disapproved the concept that the strict liability 
doctrine should be restricted to personal injury claims . 
.. [A]lthough the doctrine has been applied principally in 
connection with personal injuries sustained by expected 
users from products which are dangerous when defective, ... 
the responsibility of the maker should be no different where 
damage to the article sold or to other property of the con-
sumer is involved." (207 A.2d at p. 312.) It should be noted 
that there, as here, the court was faced with a statutory 
scheme covering implied warranties. Unlike the majority 
here, however, the New Jersey court expressly refused to 
draw an arbitrary distinction between different types of 
damage in order to give effect to those statutes in a greater 
number of situations. 
Of course, the application of the strict liability theory to 
property damage (including "economic loss") will limit 
the applicability of several sections of the recently enacted 
Commercial Code dealing with implied warranties (see, P.g., 
Com. Code~ § § 2607, 2719). But this result, even if unfor-
tunate, follows from the rationale of Greenman, which limitpd 
the effect of a statute requiring the purchaser to give dpfend-
ant notice of a breach of warranty within a reasonable time 
(former Civ. Code, § 1769). In the present case, it is not 
necessary to "extend" Greenman in order to reach the proper 
result. All that is required is that we apply its reasoning to 
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a factual sitpation which cannot be distinguished analytically 
from that case. 
In Greenman we allowed recovery for "personal injury" 
damages. It is well established that such an award may 
include compensation for past loss of time and earnings due 
to the injury (Storrs v. Los Angeles Traction 00., 134 Cal. 
91,93 [66 P. 72]),.:for loss of future earning capacity (Bon-
neau v. North Shore R.R. Co., 152 Cal. 406, 414 [93 P. 106, 
125 Am.St.Rep. 68]), and for increased living expenses 
caused by the injury (Kline v. Santa Barbara etc. Ry. Co., 
150 Cal. 741, 748-749 [90 P. 125]). There is no logical dis-
tinction between these losses and the losses suffered by plain-
tiff here. All involve economic loss, and all proximately 
arise out of the purchase of a defective product. I find it 
hard to understand how one might, for example, award a 
traveling salesman lost earnings if a defect in his car causes 
his leg to break in an accident but deny that salesman his 
lost earnings if the defect instead disables only his car 
before any accident occurs. The losses are exactly the same; 
the chains of causation are slightly different, but both are 
"proximate." Yet the majority would allow recovery under 
strict liability in the first situation but not in the second. 
This, I submit, is arbitrary.2 
The "history" of products liability law does not compel a 
dichotomy between "economic loss" and other types of 
damage. Although the various products liability doctrines 
developed in the field of personal injury claims, the over-
whelming majority of courts today make no distinction be-
tween personal injury damages and property damages (in-
cluding "economic loss") in products liability cases.s If 
2Thc majority make another arbitrary distinction when they state that 
they would allow recovery in strict liability for the damage eaused to 
plaintiff's truck in his accident, if plaintiff had proved that the defect 
caused the accident. Unlike the majority, I can attribute no significance 
to the fact that these damages sought by plaintiff were not caused by a 
collision with an external object in a sudden accident. I cannot rationally 
hold that the plaintiff whose vehicle is destroyed in an accident caused by 
a defective part may recover his property damage under a given theory 
while another pl~intiff who is astute or lucky enough to discover the 
defect and thereby avoid such an accident cannot recover for other dam-
ages proximately caused by an identical defective part. The strict lia-
bility rule should apply to both plaintiffs or to neither. They cannot be 
validly distinguished. 
3Approaehing our striet liability doctrine, the following cases have held 
that II privity" is not necessary in an action for breach of implied war-
ranty and have applied this rule to allow recovery against a manufacturer 
for property damage: Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co. (D.C.E.D.Pa. 1962) 
211 F.Supp. SSS; Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp. (Mun.Ct. 
App.D.C. 1962) IS5 A.2d 919; State Farm Mut. 4uto. Ill" 00. v. 4ftder-
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no such distinction was made under the products liability 
doctrines in use before Greenman, then such a distinction 
under Greenman's strict liability doctrine may be reason-
ably (though not necessarily) made only on the basis that 
protection of life and limb is of greater social value than 
protection against financial loss. But, as money damages 
do not replace the life or limb lost, this basis is sound only 
to,the extent that allowing recovery for personal injuries 
on, ~ strict liability theory operates as a deterrent (vis-a-vis 
the· theories formerly used) which induces manufacturers to 
be)hore careful in their production methods. But it is highly 
doubtful that Greenman's imposition of strict liability does 
furnish such a deterrent, in view of the fact that, at the time 
Greenman was rendered, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and 
thE! weakening of the "privity" requirement in implied 
warranty actions would have often subjected the manufac-
turer to liability, ()r at least to litigation, in any event, 
whenever a defect in his product caused an injury. (See, 
e.g., Escola v. Ooca Oola Bottling 00., 24 Cal.2d 453 [150 
P.2d 436}, and Peterson v. Lamb Rubber 00., 54 ·Ca1.2d 339 
[5 Cal.Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575].) "A skeptic may well ques-
tion whether the callous manufacturer, who is unmoved by the 
prospect of negligence liability, plus res ipsa loquitur, and 
by the e1Iect of any injury whatever upon the reputation 
of his goods, will really be stimulated by the relatively slight 
increase in possible liability to take additional precautions 
against defects which cannot be prevented by only reasonable 
care." (Prosser, The Assault upon the Oitadel(1960) 69 
Yale L.J. 1099, 1119.)4 The purpose of the strict liability 
,OJl·Weber, Inc. (1961) 252 Iowa 1289 [110 N.W.2d 449]; Morrow v. 
Caloric Appliance Corp. (Mo. 1963) 372 S.W.2d 41; Pabon v. Hacke'll.-
,ock Auto Sale., Inc. (1960) 63 N.J.Super. 476 [164 A.2d 773]; 50 New 
Walden, Inc. v. Federal In •. Co. (Sup.Ct. 1963) 30 Misc.2d 460 [241 
N.Y.S.2d 128]; Jamot v. Ford Motor Co. (Pa. 1959) 191 Pa.Super. 422 
[156 A.2d 568]. The following eases have abolished privity in permitting 
reeovery for damages involving the loss of (or reduced value of) the pur· 
.. hase.1 product itself', whl're no "accident" occurred: Gla/lio/a Biscuit 
Co. v. 80uthem ICII Co. (5th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 138; Hoskins v. JOCk801/. 
Grai" Co. (Fla. 1953) 63 So.2d 514; Continental Copper 4" 8teel 1ndU8-
'rie., Inc. ~. B. C. "Red" Comeliu., 1f1c. (Fla.App. 1958) 104 So.2d 40. 
Nor was privity required in Mazetti v. Armour 4" Co. (1913) 75 Wash. 
622 [135 P. 633, Ann.Cas. 1915C 140, 48 L.R.A. N.S. 213], where plain-
tiff 80ught and reeovered damages for loss of profits and loss of good· 
will only. 
4See Plant, 8trict Liability of ManufactureT8 for Injuries Call~d 
bg Defect, in Product8-.&n Opposi"g View (1957) 24 Tenn.L.Rev. 938, 
where it is said (at p. 94:5): II [W]hat is probably a more powerful in-
eentive to make products as safe as possible lies in the desire of manu· 
facturel'!' 'to avoid the danger that their products will develop a reputa-
) 
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rule as expreSsed in Greenman is not to deter, but" to insure 
that the costs of inju,ries resulting from defective. products 
. are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on 
the market rather than by the injured persons who are pow~ 
erless to protect themselves." (Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc., supra, 59 Ca1.2d 57, at p. 63.) The initial 
breakthroughs in products liability law may well have oper-
ated as deterrents when measured against the former status 
of the law, which gave the consumer little protection against 
. the manufacturer's carelessness. At that time, a distinction 
between personal injuries and other types of damage might 
have been justified .. But given the equal treatment of all 
types of damage under the law as it existed just before 
Greenman, it makes no sense to adopt a new doctrine (strict 
liability in tort) for reasons other than deterrence and then 
hold that this doctrine is limited by a distinction which can 
be justified only if the doctrine were a deterrent. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court responded to this historical argument 
in Santor, "True, the rule of implied warranty had its ges-
tative stirrings because of the greater appeal of the personal 
injury claim. But, once in existence, the field of operation 
of the remedy shQuld not be fenced in by such a factor." 
(Santor v. A &- M Karagheusian, Inc., supra, 207 A.2d 305, 
at p. 309.) 
The majority suggest that the manufacturer should bear 
(and spread) the risk of personal injury damages because 
"the cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be 
an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured .... " 
This is no reason to distinguish between personal injury 
damages and other types of damage. Such "overwhelming 
misfortune" may not be present in a given personal injury 
case, but the majority do not indicate that they would deny 
recovery in a personal injury case if this element were lack-
ing. Conversely, an economic loss might be an "overwhelm-
ing misfortune" in a given case, but I doubt that any court 
tion for being unsafe or defective and therefore be unacceptable to the 
purchasing public. Every manufacturing executive with whom the writer 
has discussed this matter regards it as a potential commercial disaster 
when one of its pr6ducts is found to be defective and the cause of an 
injury. The element which is most disturbing to manufacturers is not the 
potential judgment of legal liability but the injury which is done to the 
reputation of the product and its producer. While it may be conceivable 
that the imposition of strict liability could increase in some small measure 
the pressure upon a few backward manufacturers to make their product 
safe, it is doubtful that it will add very much to existing pressures." 
See also Bogert and Fink, BV8ine88 Practice Regarding Warrantie. ill 
the Sale of Good. (1930) 25 Ill.L.Rev. 400, 415·416. 
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would allow recovery in such a case and deny it in other 
economic loss cases. "Overwhelming misfortunes" might 
occur more often in personal injury cases than in property 
damage or economic loss cases (although the majority cite 
no evidence to this effect), but this is no reason to draw the 
line between these types of injury when a more sensible line 
is available. Suppose, for example, defective house paint is 
sold. ·to two home· owners. One suffers temporary illness 
from~noxious fumes, while the other's house is destroyed by 
rot pecause the paint proved ineffective (a loss generally un-
insul.'"ed). Although the latter buyer may clearly suffer the 
grea'ter misfortune, the majority would not let him recover 
under the strict liability doctrine because hill loss is solely 
"ecOnomic," while letting the first buyer recover the minimal 
costs and lost earnings caused by his illness. 
The majority unduly fear that, if the strict liability rule 
is applied to economic loss, "The manufacturer would be 
liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope." This 
would not be so if the notion of "defective" in the strict 
lial:!ility doctrine is viewed as coextensive with the concept 
of "unmerchantable" in the implied warranty field. This 
term has been well defined by case law and has been deemed 
to be certain enough for use in our recently enacted Com-
mercial Code (see § 2314). Equating "defective" with "un-
merchantable" comports with the purpose of Greenman, 
which was not to expand the notion of when the manufacturer 
has breached his initially implied duty to the purchaser, but 
only to eliminate the sales law's restrictions on recovery for 
that breach of duty (the privity and notice requirements 
and the operation of disclaimers) where the buyer is an 
ordinary consumer. 
The majority also point to Mr. Barefield's alleged success 
with the truck and state that "If under these circumstances 
defendant is strictly liable in tort for the commercial loss 
suffered by plaintiff, then it would be liable for business losses 
of other truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to meet the 
specific needs of their businesses, even though those needs were 
communicated only to the dealer." Here the majority seem to 
equate strict liability and the implied warranty of fitness for 
a particular purpose. (See Com. Code, § 2315.)5 No authority 
... Where the seller at the ti~e of contracting has reason to know any 
tartlcular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer 
reQ'ing on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable 
fOOds, there. is .•. an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for 
neb PUrp~Be:" (See alBO former Civ. Code, t 1735, Bubd. (1).) 
) 
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is cited for this ,proposition,and I have found none. So far as 
I know, no p.!9p0nent of the concept of manufacturers' strict 
liability has" 'ever seriously argued that the manufacturer 
should be liab~e for the product's inability. to serve speciftc 
needs which the buyer communicates only to the retailer, ex-
cept insofar as those needs conformtow}J,at the product is 
ordinarily expected (by the manufacturer and the consuming 
public) to do. Mr. Barefield's testimony went only to show 
that the truck could·.d9 "the jQbs for which it was built" 
(Greenman v. Yuba Power. Pro~ucts,Inc., supra, 59 Ca1.2d 
57,64), i.e., that it was merchantable. Apparently he did not 
convince the trial court. I fail to see how this testimony tends . 
to support the majority's "horrible consequences" argument, . 
for there is no indication that the trial court relied on plain-. 
tiff's or Barefield's communications of their needs to the dealer 
in finding the truck to be "defective," 
The majority recognize that the';l'ules governing warranties 
were developed to meet the needs of "commercial transac-
tions." If this is so, then why not look to the transaction be-
tween the buyer and the seller and see if it was a "commercial" 
transaction rather than a sale to an ordinary consumer at the 
end of the marketing chain f How can the nature of the 
damages which occur later, long after the transaction has been 
completed, control the characterization of the' transaction f . 
Any line which determines whether damages should be covered 
by warranty law or the strict liability doctrine .. shouldbe 
drawn at the time the sale is made. 
In Greenman, we relied to some degree upon Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960) 32 N.J. 358 [161 A.2d 69, 
75 A.L.R.2d 1J. Henningsen held a manufacturer liable by 
holding privity to be unnecessary in an implied warranty ac-
tion and held that the manufacturer's disclaimer of all war-
ranties was contrary to public policy and therefore void. This 
was based upon a realistic appraisal of the "freedom of con-
tract" commonly vested in the consumer in today's economy, 
where gross inequality of bargaining power is pervasive . 
.. The trad\,tional contract is the result of free bargaining of 
parties who are brought together by the play of the market, 
and who meet each other on a footing of approximate economic 
equality. In such a society'there is no danger that freedom 
of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole. 
But in present-day commercial life the standardized mass 
contract has appeared. It is llsed primarily by enterprises 
with strong bargaining power and position. 'The weaker party, 
in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position 
i 
! 
I 
I 
I 
June 1965] SEELY V. WHITE MOTOR Co. 
[63 C.2d 8; 45 Cal.Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 1451 
27 
to shop around for better terms, either because the author of 
the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) 
or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual 
intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms 
dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are 
often understood in a vague way, if at all.' " (Henningsen v, 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra (N.J. 1960) 161 A.2d at p. 86.) 
I am not concerned over the fact that if damages on the 
strict liability theory are 'allowed here, this may limit the ap-
plication of some of':the restrictive statutory provisions relat-
ing to warranty. In my opinion those restrictive provisions 
shouJQ. not apply to the ordinary consumer, who is usually 
unable to protect himself from insidious contractual provisions 
such' as disclaimers, foisted upon him by commercial enter-
pris~s whose bargaining power he is seldom able to match, 
and who" 'is seldom "steeped in the business practice which 
justifies ... " , "the notice requirement (Greenman v. Yuba 
Power ProduCts, Inc., supra, 59 Ca1.2d 57, at p. 61), and 
who should not be barred-by the privity requirement (see fn. 3, 
supra). The' purpose of the strict liability rule adopted in 
Greenman was to protect people who are" powerless to protect 
themselves." (Id. at p. 63.) This does not mean, however, that 
the implied warranty sections of the code should not apply 
within the world of commerce, where parties generally bargain 
on a somewhat equal plane and may be presumed to be familiar 
with the legal problems involved when defective goods are 
purchased.6 
Although this is a close case, I would find that plaintiff was 
an ordinary consumer insofar as the purchase involved here was 
aSee Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales (1963) 77 Harv. 
L.Rev. 318, 327·328: "A thwarting of the policies behind warranty need 
Dot attend recognition of disclaimers in the co:nmercial world. There the 
buyer may bc just as able to absorb and administer the inevitable risks 
of the seller's operations, Indeed, the seller may be an essential experi· 
mental or otherww;s,margillal entrepreneur who would be unable profit· 
ably to bear the recurrent costs of strict liability. There is common re-
course to insurance. The size of the transactions and the access to tech-
nical knowledge make attempts to prove negligence more feasible. Buyers 
may even dictate the design, and thus be in a position to prevent the 
losses to which they are exposed. They are more eapable of protecting 
themselves by caution and testing, and their own manufacturing processes 
and quality control systems stand between the object and ultimate users 
or bystanders. ' 
.. In sales by mass producing and marketing enterprises to individual 
Consumers, however, the reasons for recognition of disclaimers are rarely 
applicable. When they are, recognition of the disclaimers they support is 
1Isually not compatible with realization of the policies behind warranties. 
The comparative helplessness of the modern consumer generally eliminates 
the p088ibillty of a free and informed choice to assume a risk, of a course 
) 
28 
.. ." '" .. .. .., .... 
SEELY V. WHITE MOTOR Co. (63 C.2d 
concerned, even though he '6'ought the truck for use in hi~ busi-
:r;tess. ~inti.1I was an owner-driver of a single truck he used for 
hauling and not. a fleet-owner who bought trucks regulat:ly in 
the course of his business;:, He was the final link in the market-
ing chain, ha.ving no mo're bargaining power than does the dsu-
al individual who purchases a motor vehicle on the retailJevel. 
I recognize that this "ordinary consumer" test needs judi-
cial definition,. This should be done on a case-by-case qasis as 
is customarily done 'with-any new doctrine. It is, hiever, 
the best resolution ofthe.:'dilemma facing this court. I ssume 
that the majority do not wish to overrule Greenman. Ii the 
other hand, neither the majority nor I wish to extend reen-
man so as to completely deny any effect. to tlie'disclai~t,:and 
notice provisions of the Oommercial Code~ . Thus, a lill Blust 
be drawn somewhere. The line drawn by the majority' s'i.ar-
bitrary and artificial, .. th~re being no sound :basis .~<f :~is­
tinguishing between ,tp€ tiP~of. d~mage assigned to' op,9,site 
sides of the majority 's li~e: --The'line,l suggest would s~jl to 
fit squarely within the r...as1ins for the'strict liability rult. ~ 
The majority obj~~ to applyj.ngthe strict liability do~ine 
to economic loss because they feel that the manufac\Urer 
should be able to sell its px:oduct "as is." But this obj~~on 
overlooks the f~t. that the strict liability rule would allo~;'the 
manufacturer to do. this iIi certain cases. The strict lia£tity 
rule, for example, permitS :th~ defense of assumption of nu. 
"Here, as elsewhere, the ptrti~'ti.1I will not be heard to comp.lain 
of a risk which he has eticountered voluntarily, or broulrht 
upon himself with full knowledge and appreciation of the 
danger." (Prosser, Torts (3d ed.1964) p. 539.)1 
of negotiations which mayb~ ev,idenced in a contract, or of a true bar-
gain. And whenever the cos;"of an inevitable risk is borne by the eon-
sumer, it cannot be ~stered to those who benefit from it or serve as 
an incentive to improvement.? ~_ _ ' .. 
See also Llewellyn, .0" Wan-anty of QuaZify, and Society (1936) 36 
Colum.L.Rev. 6991 712-713, 721;; Prosser, .The ..fssault upon tile Citadel, 
supra (1960) 69 Yale L.J. 1099 1133. . , ~ 
7Where 80memanufacturerll -:::o~ a given product disclaun,Jiabiliit and 
others do not, then a consumer who buys from a disclaiming manufac· 
turer, knowing of. the disclaiDl,er, has "assumed the risk," He has a 
"reasonable alternative" (ilf.~-at p:'540), buying from a manufacturer 
who did not disclaim (and pgrhap8' paying a higher price f9r the maim-
fncturer to retain these risks). When all manufacturers disclaim, however, 
then it can hardly be said th&tC6.~buyer assumes the risk imposed by such 
a diselailner when he buys tha. ~:tct. Of course, even if all manufac-
turers have diselaimers, if the consumer buys a product raising a greater 
risk of injury (economic or perilnal) than those of the other manufac-
turers (perhaps because the product is cheaply mad&. or of an experi-
mental design), knowing of this increased. risk,. then·~the buyer has 
assumed the added risk. He could have purchased a 8af~rproduct. Under 
, _l 
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To sum up, all the strict liability rule does. to implied war-
ranty law is abolish the notice requirement, restrict the effec-
tiveness of disclaimers to situations where it can be reasonably 
said that the consumer has freely ~umed the risk, and abolish 
the privity requirement, where ordinary consumers are in-
volved. It does not introduce a notion of "defective" which is 
different from that of"unmerch~nj;able" in implied warranty· 
law. These changes ptoperly. adapt:~raditional sales law to the 
marketing:p"osition of today's ordinary consumer. Under the 
majority dicta, which would· deny plaintiff the price of his 
truck as well as his lost profits on a strict liability theory, 
the housewife who buys a new refrigerator with such a serious 
defect as to make it useless cannot recover for the loss of her 
purchase price from the manufacturer (unless there is an 
express warranty), because of the privity doctrine (Burr v. 
Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 695-696 [268 P.2d 104]). 
Should the privity doctrine be abolished,the manufacturer's 
disclaimer of implied warranties would bar her, even if she 
could not buy a new refrigerator without a similar disclaimer. 
Further, if there were no disclaimer, her failure to give the 
manufacturer reasonable notice of the defect would bar her 
effort to recover. These results cannot be reconciled with the 
holding and rationale of Greenman. 
Thus, although I would affirm, I would do so on the basis 
of the strict liability doctrine. 
The petition of the defendant and appellant for a rehear-
ing was denied July 21, 1965. Peters, J., was of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted . 
. . . ~ 
tJae faeta involved in this case, of course, we need not be concerned with ~~ problem, for the majority properly found that White's attt'mpt to 
11im11D!t ita liability was ineffective, for White failed to perform even ita 
lted obligation to plaintiff. 
